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Martin Holbraad
Ontology, Ethnography, Archaeology:  
an Afterword on the Ontography of Things
that the people whose lives they study, their activi-
ties and relationships, as well as the various ‘things’ 
these may involve, might in all sorts of ways exceed 
those coordinates.
Animism, the theme of this Special Section, is a 
great example. Leaving to one side the well-known 
Victorian evolutionary typologies, let us say, broadly 
and imprecisely, that the phenomena one is tempted 
to call animist are ones that appear to posit ontological 
continuities, or even identities, where the analyst’s 
‘common sense’, and the intellectual traditions that 
inform it, posits ontological separations. This Special 
Section provides a host of such cases. Think, for exam-
ple, of the Andean huacas discussed by Bray: trees, 
rocks, figures or temples that are considered to be liv-
ing beings since they are ‘charged’ with camay, a form 
of power or life-force that could be compared with the 
much-discussed Oceanian notion of mana (Bray, pp. 
358–9 this issue). In ways that may be substantially 
varied when compared to one another, such cases are 
analytically compelling precisely because they appear 
to transgress distinctions that the analyst and his or 
her readers may fairly take as axiomatic — e.g. that 
things, such as rocks or the temples Andeans built 
with them, are not living beings. Or, to put the point 
differently, what these cases have in common is that, 
when described in the analyst’s default terms, they 
become irreducibly paradoxical, or even, as the old 
gloss had it, ‘irrational’ (Sperber 1985) — e.g. inani-
mate things (e.g. stones) that are animate. 
In commenting on the preceding articles of the Special Section, this afterword elaborates on 
the methodological and analytical implications for archaeology of the ontological alterity 
of animist phenomena. If such phenomena are challenging because they transgress the 
conceptual coordinates of archaeologists’ habitual interpretive repertoires (mind vs matter, 
materiality vs culture, etc.), then what might archaeology’s response to such challenges be, 
what might be distinctively archaeological about it, and how might it compare to related 
concerns among socio-cultural anthropologists and philosophers?
As a social anthropologist with an interest in ‘things’ 
(surely a tautology),1 my last, and only other, sub-
stantial  engagement  with  archaeologists  was  at  a 
conference on the theme of cognition and material 
culture, organized a few years ago in Cambridge by 
Lambros Malafouris and Colin Renfrew.2 As with 
the  present  occasion,  the  engagement  was  made 
on the back of Thinking Through Things: Theorising 
Artefacts Ethnographically (2007), a volume I edited 
together  with Amiria  Salmond  (formerly  Henare) 
and Sari Wastell, which explored the implications 
for the study of ‘things’ of what we (and others) 
call the ‘ontological turn’ in recent developments in 
anthropological theory. Since the book was in press at 
the time, the three of us used the occasion to present 
the main argument of its Introduction — a text to 
which a number of the articles in this Special Section 
refer. We argued that the problem with many con-
temporary attempts to theorize the role of ‘material 
culture’ in people’s lives — including, for example, 
our  conference  hosts’  otherwise  highly  attractive 
suggestion that material objects play a constitutive 
role  in  human  cognitive  activities  —  is  that  they 
tend to work within the analytical coordinates of the 
debates to which they seek to contribute, i.e. debates 
in  the  Western  intellectual  tradition,  about  the 
relationship between mind and matter, subjects and 
objects, materiality and culture, and so forth. This is 
problematic for archaeologists and anthropologists, 
we suggested, in so far as it discounts the possibility 
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Faced with such paradoxes, we argued at the 
conference, archaeologists and anthropologists have 
two broad options. The first is to uphold the integrity 
of their own analytical assumptions by showing that, 
suitably elaborated, they can account for the paradoxi-
cal materials that appear to contradict them. Victorian 
anthropology  provides  perhaps  the  most  extreme 
example of this approach, in taking the paradoxes 
of, say, animism as ‘confusions’, and then accounting 
for them as symptoms of a more primitive stage of 
human development — a take that is still with us 
today  in  fields  such  as  cognitive  archaeology  and 
anthropology, evolutionary psychology and so forth. 
But less uncompromising approaches in mainstream 
archaeology  and  anthropology  today  are  not  sub-
stantially dissimilar in their implications. Arguably, 
when  anthropologists  or  archaeologists  ask  them-
selves questions as commonplace in contemporary 
research as ‘Why does/did such-and-such group treat 
things as people?’, or ‘What relationship between the 
material and the mental (the social, the cultural) does 
such-and-such animist phenomenon imply?’, they are 
continuing the basic line of thought of the Victorians. 
Namely, they assume that their own commonsense 
assumptions, such as the distinction between things 
and people, have enough purchase on the animist 
phenomena  under  study  to  furnish  an  account  of 
them — explanations, interpretations, and so on. To 
the extent that dominant theoretical dilemmas in the 
field (e.g. realism vs constructivism, universalism vs 
relativism, processual vs post-processual archaeology, 
etc.) offer competing versions of it, it is justified to 
think of this approach as mainstream. 
In various contexts I have advanced a number of 
arguments against this approach, drawing mainly on 
the work of Bruno Latour, Marilyn Strathern, Eduardo 
Viveiros de Castro and Roy Wagner.3 Here we may 
note only its basic irony. If, as I have stipulated, the 
most obvious characteristic of phenomena such as 
animism is that they appear to contradict the terms 
in which Western academic debates are cast, is it not 
somewhat odd to insist on casting one’s accounts of 
these phenomena in just those terms? 
To  see  how  strange  —  perverse  even  —  this 
analytical tack is, consider the inverse case. For lack 
of familiarity and understanding (and this is also the 
point), my illustration can only be so crude and puta-
tive that it may seem facetious.4 But, drawing on the 
Andeanist contributions to this volume, imagine for 
a moment an Inca analysis of, say, a Euro-American 
‘thing’. For its particular resonance, take the case of the 
huge granite sculptures of the four former US presi-
dents at Mount Rushmore, South Dakota. One might 
imagine that at first a putative Inca researcher would 
be nonplussed. US natives, he might initially surmise, 
are like us: they know about the camaquen of stone (i.e. 
its ‘life force or energy’, as Bray glosses it), and use it to 
make massive stone-brothers for their ancestral rulers, 
rather like our huacas. For example, their ‘sculptures’, 
as they call them, look like their rulers even more than 
our huauques look like ours, and are even bigger than 
Guanacaure, our guanca-rock at Cusco. 
However, the Inca researcher might continue, 
closer  scrutiny  reveals  stark  divergences.  While 
thousands of people do congregate at the site every 
year, they do not seem to perform anything like our 
capacocha  ceremonies  there.  In  particular,  they  do 
not dress the huaca up, nor do they feed them with 
sacrifices — in fact, when Lakota Native Americans 
conducted such ceremonies at the site in 1971 they 
caused a huge furore among its official guardians. 
Indeed, when asked about the importance of this 
huaca to the US and its empire, American informants 
tended to emphasize its significance as a ‘memorial’ 
to great rulers of the past (hence its title of ‘National 
Memorial’), making no mention of its camaquen and 
the  indispensable  role  it  plays  in  sustaining  the 
US  empire,  giving  it  victory  against  its  enemies. 
According to them, if Mount Rushmore contributes 
to the might of the US at all, this is only because 
of the ‘memories’ it evokes as a ‘symbol’ or a ‘rep-
resentation’, as they call it, of past greatness. And 
when asked to explain this, informants emphasize 
that such things as ‘memories’ are not to be found 
in the huaca at all (‘it is only a carved rock’, they 
say), but rather in the ‘minds’ or ‘hearts’ of those 
who behold its magnificence. All of which raises a 
series of analytical questions. Given the indisputable 
might of the US, how can we account for the fact that 
Americans ignore the camaquen of Mount Rushmore? 
Is this perhaps a different kind of camaquen — one 
that works without sacrifices? Furthermore, given 
the Americans’ emphasis on ‘memory’, how can we 
explain the notion that camaquen might reside only in 
the heads or hearts of what they call ‘the people’, but 
not in the huaca rock-brothers of their rulers? 
I imagine that at most one would want to char-
acterize this kind of analysis as endearing, though 
one might also call it absurd. The analysis, one is 
tempted to say, might reveal a whole lot about the 
Inca, but tells us nothing about the Americans and 
their monuments (or their ‘things’ more generally). In 
fact it completely confuses the matter. The problem is 
that the assumptions on which the analysis is based 
are not only entirely alien to the data it purports to 
illuminate, but also in direct contradiction with it. For 433
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example, the Inca researcher assumes that since the 
sculptures of Mount Rushmore are made of stone they 
must be animated by power (or whatever camaquen 
might be), while Americans say the opposite for pre-
cisely the same reason (viz. the sculptures are ‘mere 
rock’). This leads the analysis into a double confusion. 
Firstly,  even  the  supposedly  ‘bare’  description,  in 
terms of huacas, camaquen and so on, is so bizarre as 
to render the phenomena described barely recogniz-
able. Secondly, the systematic distortions introduced 
by these descriptions lead the analyst into a series of 
questions that seem entirely misplaced. For example, 
when the Inca analyst wonders how the camaquen of 
Mount Rushmore might ‘work’ without sacrifices, all 
we can do is point out that the question is based on a 
misunderstanding: whatever camaquen might be (and 
on this we can remain agnostic), Mount Rushmore just 
isn’t the kind of thing that has it. 
Exactly  the  same  problem,  I  argue,  holds  for 
analyses of animism that are premised on non-animist 
assumptions. When archaeologists and anthropolo-
gists set for themselves the task of accounting for why 
sundry people across the world imbue material objects 
with all manner of non-material properties (spirit, 
agency,  intentionality,  personhood,  etc.),  why  they 
venerate them as gods, do magic with them, and so 
on, they commit an analytical blunder of precisely the 
same proportions as the Inca analyst who wonders 
about the camaquen of Mount Rushmore. Whatever 
the ‘things’ of animism might be, they are certainly 
not material objects (nor, by the same token, are they 
‘imbued’  with  ‘non-material  properties’).  And  we 
know this precisely because even our best attempts to 
describe these phenomena come up with consistently 
blatant contradictions, as we have seen. 
Now, one response to this way of setting up the 
problem is to bite the bullet. According to this view, 
the symmetry (sensu Latour 1993) that I have set up 
between the animist take on non-animism and the 
non-animist take on animism is false. And this is just 
because,  while  the  latter  is  based  on  assumptions 
that are true, the former is based on false ones. Both 
Mount Rushmore and the things Andeans call huacas 
are basically just rocks, and neither of them is imbued 
with the putative sacred power of camaquen, which 
is after all just a belief people in that region held. So 
the contradictions to which our descriptions of these 
beliefs give rise (material objects that are immaterial 
forces and so on) are real: it is animism that is con-
tradictory, not our description of it. We are therefore 
justified in seeking to describe these contradictions in 
all their complexity, and explain why certain people 
come to believe in them. 
As Viveiros de Castro has argued most polemi-
cally, this response (which is intuitive to most archaeo-
logists and anthropologists), is, if nothing else, politi-
cally and ethically problematic (Viveiros de Castro 2003; 
see also Evens 2008). To deny the symmetry implied 
by my thought-experiment with Inca analytics is just 
to assert the intellectual superiority of the West over 
the Incas and others like them — a form of conceptual 
imperialism,  as  Viveiros  de  Castro  has  it.  With  his 
compelling call to take animism as ‘a serious theoreti-
cal platform [for pushing] a postcolonial critique of the 
discipline [of archaeology]’, Haber takes a similar line 
in his contribution to this Special Section. 
Here, however, I want to point out merely that 
the aforementioned response is a non sequitur. What 
is at issue in the dispute between the asymmetrical 
and the symmetrical account is, precisely, whether 
contradictory statements such as ‘material objects are 
immaterial forces’ are accurate descriptions of Inca 
‘beliefs’ or a consequence of our analytical misun-
derstandings. To point out that such statements are 
false does nothing to settle the dispute, since this is 
precisely the point on which both sides agree — the 
question being how to account for it meta-theoreti-
cally. And note that the typical further move in favour 
of asymmetry, namely to say something along the lines 
that, beyond points of logic, we have good scientific 
reasons to believe that things like stones are inanimate 
(spirits do not exist etc.), is just as confused. Truth-
claims of this kind presuppose that we understand 
what the ‘content’ of animist ‘beliefs’ is, which, again, 
is just what is at issue. 
All of which suggests the alternative to what I am 
calling the ‘mainstream’ approach to animism, which 
is to suppose that, in a very basic and abiding sense, 
we do not understand the phenomena in question. Not 
only is this just as cogent an account for why even 
our  best  descriptions  of  animist  phenomena  take 
the form of contradictions in terms — just as cogent, 
that is, as concluding, arrogantly, that animists are 
contradicting  themselves.  It  is  also  more  intellectu-
ally  imaginative.  For,  on  this  account,  phenomena 
such as animism mark the limits of the conceptual 
repertoires we bring to them, which implies that the 
only way even to understand what these phenomena 
are, let alone explain why they might be so, is to 
break out of the circle of our conceptual repertoire. If 
the concepts we use to describe animist phenomena 
produce contradictions, then the analytical onus is on 
us to find alternative concepts that do not. In place of 
explanations or interpretations of animist phenomena, 
then, this approach gives logical priority to the task of 
conceptualization: what kind of thing must ‘things’ and 434
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‘spirits’ be if statements such as ‘things are spirits’ are 
to make sense as more than just bizarre oxymorons? 
What might ‘things’ be if they are to be conceived as, 
in some pertinent and coherent sense, non-material, as 
animist phenomena so often require? What concepts 
might replace the very distinction between the ‘mate-
rial’ and the ‘immaterial’, which is so pernicious to the 
analysis of animist phenomena that it renders them 
downright contradictory? 
In the aforementioned Cambridge conference we 
made rather a big point of the irreducibly ontological 
character of these kinds of questions — asking what 
things are in animism, as opposed to what people 
might think them to be. Elsewhere, I have called this 
approach ‘ontographic’ (e.g. Holbraad 2003 and in 
press — I follow the neologism below for conven-
ience), to indicate its peculiar investment in charting 
the ontological status of diverse ethnographic (and 
by extension archaeological) data. But however one 
chooses to brand the approach (and many may find 
the notion of ‘alternative ontologies’ — e.g. the idea 
that animist things just are different from what we take 
things to be when we deem them to be material — too 
outlandish to swallow), the point we may hold onto 
here is that, on this view, anthropological and archaeo-
logical analysis must ultimately take the form of what 
one might call thought-experimentation. Effectively, 
this approach commits the analyst to a radical and 
copious effort to overcome the contradictions in which 
his or her initial descriptions of animist phenomena are 
necessarily mired, by reconceptualizing the very terms 
in which these descriptions are cast. This intellectual 
exercise, we may note, is perhaps more akin to the 
kinds of thought-experiments in which philosophers 
typically engage (brains in vats, twin planets and so 
on) than it is to the kind of scientific detective-work 
archaeologists often imagine themselves doing (or, for 
that matter, the rarefied travel-writing in which much 
anthropology, still today, exhausts itself). 
Before closing I shall return to this question of 
thought-experimentation  and  its  particular  role  in 
archaeology. However, we may pause briefly here to 
consider the contributions to this volume in light of 
the discussion so far. As may well be expected, the 
articles vary in the degree to which they adopt the 
ontographic approach I have just outlined. Alberti 
& Marshall and Bray herself are perhaps the most 
explicit about their basic sympathy to it, and offer a 
range of suggestive reconceptualizations in the course 
of discussing, respectively, ‘body-pots’ found in north-
western Argentina and the aforementioned Andean 
huacas. For example, I was particularly intrigued by 
Alberti & Marshall’s suggestion that the ‘anomalies’ of 
gender diacritics of the Argentine body-pots require 
us to rethink the habitual coupling of ‘matter’ with 
‘stability’, and instead conceive of matter as a site of 
primordially  ‘unstable’  self-differentiation  (an  idea 
that runs parallel, as Alberti & Marshall also indicate, 
to Viveiros de Castro’s conceptualization of ‘nature’, 
rather than ‘culture’, as a site of ontological differ-
ence in Amerindian cosmologies). And one question 
I would ask is how this way of thinking might best be 
compared with Bray’s own suggestion that the ‘power’ 
of  Inca  huacas,  constitutive  rather  than  just  repre-
sentative of the might of the Inca empire itself, can be 
understood partly as a function of the durability of 
stone (Bray, p. 363 this issue). Both the (apparently) 
‘material’ contrasts between ceramics and stone, and 
the ‘structural’ contrasts between non-imperial and 
imperial forms of political organization and cosmol-
ogy, seem relevant here.
At the other end of the spectrum, a number of the 
contributions adopt strategies that come closer to what 
I have called the ‘mainstream’. As Alberti & Marshall 
penetratingly show, the frequent appeal, for example, 
to Gell’s (in so many ways wonderful) analysis of the 
‘agency of objects’ is one such. I can only concur with 
Alberti & Marshall when they write that such appeals 
act ‘as a cognitive trap that prevents archaeologists 
from launching a fully ontological inquiry’ (p. 346 
this issue). In essence, Gellian approaches turn on 
the idea that animism is just an example of a more 
abiding human tendency in certain circumstances to 
treat objects as if they were persons — other examples 
being Westerners’ admiration of fine art, swearing 
at a car when it fails to start, or a child’s game with 
a doll (Gell 1998). As Alberti & Marshall so nicely 
put it, however, if this approach is meant to confirm 
‘our  apparent  commitment  to  [animist]  beliefs’,  it 
also ‘masks the absence of our belief in [animists’] 
actual commitments’ (p. 346 this issue). Not least, it 
masks our disbelief in the commitment that, unlike 
paintings, cars or dolls, in some crucial and irreduc-
ible sense objects just are people. Sillar’s contribution 
may exemplify such a stance to a certain extent. His 
highly illuminating account of how in the highlands 
of the Central Andes ánimo is deemed to permeate a 
‘social hierarchy of animate entities’ (p. 372 this issue) 
whose inter-relationships can be influenced through 
ritual offerings of different kinds is articulated analyti-
cally in terms of a Gellian analogy between animist 
‘beliefs’ and the broader (universal?) human capacity 
for engaging socially with non-human entities. But 
this, it seems to me, still leaves unanswered the core 
challenge that Andean animism should pose: to the 
extent that we, for example, do not extend ‘our capac-435
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ity for engaging socially with non-human entities’ to 
mountains (for instance, we do not assume that they 
are sentient and demand ritual offerings), how are we 
to make sense of the ways in which Andeans do so? 
So  one  way  of  putting  the  contrast  between 
mainstream and ontographic approaches is by inver-
sion: mainstream approaches use ‘ordinary’ analytical 
assumptions  (i.e.  the  commonsense  assumptions 
in which the language we use to describe our data 
involves us) to account for ‘extraordinary’ data (e.g. 
animist phenomena) in more ordinary terms, while 
ontographic  ones  use  the  extraordinary  data  to 
reconceptualize ordinary assumptions in extraordi-
nary ways. This way of putting it, however, suggests 
that there may also be a rather broad tract of middle 
ground between these two (perhaps too) ideotypical 
positions. After all, one might be tempted to argue, 
what counts as ‘ordinary’ or ‘extraordinary’ in any 
given case is rather less clear-cut than I have been 
making it out to be. Indeed, in speaking of ‘common 
sense’ assumptions, informed by ‘Western intellectual 
traditions’, have I not presented as unduly monolithic 
the  conceptual  resources  upon  which  analysts  of 
animism and other ‘extraordinary’ data may draw? 
Crucially, what I have ignored is that it is very much 
part of what I have branded as ‘Western intellectual 
tradition’ to dispute, transgress and otherwise transform 
itself in all sorts of ways, and this means that within this 
tradition are to be found a host of different and often 
competing conceptual repertoires. It would follow, 
therefore, that between the two extreme options of 
either misunderstanding animism by thinking about it 
with inappropriate concepts or using it as a lever with 
which to transform such concepts, there is a broad 
third one, which is to explore the enormous conceptual 
wealth of the Western intellectual tradition in order 
to find concepts that may, after all, be appropriate to 
the analysis of animism, and thus may allow us to 
describe and understand it without distortion. Indeed, 
as Christopher Bracken shows in his remarkable book 
Magical  Criticism:  the  Recourse  of  Savage  Philosophy 
(2007), most of the apparently ‘extraordinary’ features 
we associate with animism and related ‘non-modern’ 
phenomena are also found in such familiar intellectual 
movements as phenomenology, semiotics, or idealist 
metaphysics, not to mention high literature, surrealist 
art or even theoretical physics. 
Most of the articles in this collection develop 
arguments of this kind in one way or other. I do too in 
my own work on Afro-Cuban religion (e.g. Holbraad 
2008), and so does Viveiros de Castro — perhaps the 
most articulate proponent of the ontological turn in 
anthropology — with his close alignment of Amerin-
dian ‘perspectivism’ with Gilles Deleuze’s philosophi-
cal writings (e.g. Viveiros de Castro in press). Here I 
want briefly to comment on the pitfalls of these kinds 
of moves with reference to the notion of ‘relational 
ontology’, which, as Alberti & Bray point out in their 
Introduction, is a theme that is common to all of the 
contributions to this Special Section. 
‘All the authors in the issue work through the 
consequences of reconfiguring ontology as, at its basis, 
relational’, observe Alberti & Bray (p. 339 this issue). 
In doing so, Alberti & Bray explain, the authors align 
themselves with broader tendencies in recent philoso-
phy and social theory to move away from ‘modernist’ 
(or ‘substantivist’, ‘representational’) ontology, with 
its axiomatic ‘Cartesian’ divide between mind and 
matter, and towards a more equal and dynamic onto-
logical playing-field in which, as Herva puts it in his 
own contribution, ‘all entities in the world (organisms 
and things) are continuously changing, or coming 
into being, and […] the identities and properties of 
entities are determined by the relationships between 
entities’ (p. 388 this issue). Bruno Latour and Tim 
Inglod, along with Viveiros de Castro, loom large in 
the  contributors’  varied  accounts  of  this  analytical 
shift, as Alberti & Bray point out. Other prominent 
references in individual contributions are to works as 
varied as Clark & Chalmers’s model of the ‘extended 
mind’ (Herva), Gibsonian and Batesonian ecologies 
(Herva, Zedeño), Butler on gender (Dowson), Mead’s 
social behaviourism (Sillar), and Barad’s metaphysics 
of matter (Alberti & Marshall).
In light of the many affinities between the animist 
phenomena under study and these varied versions of 
‘western theoretical animism’, in Alberti & Marshall’s 
suggestive phrase (p. 347 this issue), it would be down-
right irresponsible not to make the links. What may 
be more troubling, however, is the tendency among 
the contributors to use these links to make what one 
might call, tongue-in-cheek, arguments from ‘Western 
theoretical authority’. In its strongest version, this move 
involves showing that, in some sense, animist phenom-
ena from the archaeological and ethnographic record 
‘bear out’ the deeper truth of the ‘relational ontology’ 
advanced by Western theorists, and their superiority to 
the Cartesian ontology to which they are opposed (a 
kind of ‘animism good, Cartesianism bad’ agenda). In 
weaker versions, the move is inverse, namely showing 
that Western theorists’ arguments in favour of relational 
ontology succeed in bearing out the truth of animist 
phenomena where Cartesian assumptions fail. In other 
words,  such  moves  exemplify  the  ‘middle-ground’ 
approach outlined earlier: moving between the options 
already  available  in  Western  intellectual  debates  in 436
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order to find the appropriate ontological assumptions 
for understanding animism. 
There are arguably a number of pitfalls involved 
even in the weakest versions in this approach. Instead 
of listing them, however, here we may indicate three 
basic conditions this approach would have to meet in 
order to be successful. All three conditions have to do 
with the requirement for what one could call analyti-
cal ‘sharpness’ — my feeling being that the tendency 
of the approach is towards bluntness and therefore, 
sometimes, analytical murk. I leave it to the reader 
to decide how far each of the articles in this Special 
Section manages to avoid this danger.
Firstly, appeals to anti-Cartesian theories would 
have to be sufficiently developed to specify sufficient 
conditions for making sense of animist phenomena. 
Exploring, for example, the affinity between the ‘rela-
tional’ premises of European phenomenology (or Gib-
sonian ecology, or what have you) and a given set of 
animist phenomena may perhaps be a good first step 
towards developing an adequate analysis of the latter. 
Arguably, however, it will rarely be enough. And this 
is because, notwithstanding Alberti & Marshall’s nice 
metaphor of ‘theoretical animism’, only rarely will 
Western relational theories be ‘animist’ in the same 
sense as the phenomena under study. At the very 
least, with the possible exception of late Heidegger 
and some of the more Californian versions of Bateson, 
such writings typically remain silent on the efficacy of 
house-spirits, and rarely require readers to perform 
blood sacrifices to stones. Doing justice to animist 
commitments, therefore, must involve exploring also 
the limitations of such theories.
Secondly,  appeals  to  Western  theories  would 
also have to be sufficiently discriminating to specify 
necessary conditions for understanding animism. One 
would be hard pressed, I think, to come up with an 
example of a Western articulation of relational onto-
logy that did not involve a whole series of claims and 
concerns that may not only be entirely irrelevant to 
animism, but also possibly downright antithetical to 
it — Latour’s concern with the practice of science, 
Ingold’s  phenomenologically  and  ecologically-
inspired love of ‘dwelling’, Deleuze’s disdain for capi-
talism and Freudianism, and so on. Western theory, at 
the very least, comes with ‘baggage’. So appeals to it 
must involve a hefty amount of sifting at least.
Finally, the requirement for specificity and ana-
lytical sharpness also stems from the wide diversity of 
animist phenomena themselves. That is to say, while 
it may be true that ‘relational ontology’ is something 
of a common denominator for animist phenomena, 
it is also amply clear that it hardly accounts for the 
peculiar ways in which each of them may be analyti-
cally challenging.5 I already noted, for example, that 
while Alberti & Marshall’s body-pots and Bray’s huacas 
may both fairly be described in relational terms, they 
may also display significant differences that can only 
be brought into view with further analytical work. 
Similarly, it would obviously be too blunt to expect 
that, say, medieval pipes in Finland (Herva) and pre-
historic cave-carvings in southern Africa (Dowson) 
are  basically  phenomena  of  the  same  (‘relational’) 
order, and leave their analysis at that. So any appeal 
to Western theory would have to be sophisticated 
enough  to  articulate  the  specificities  of  each  case, 
raising the further challenge of comparisons between 
them. To the extent that Western theories are typically 
not conceived with these particular subtleties in mind, 
it follows that, again, appeals to them must be made 
with extra care. 
In summary, then, the task of conceptualization 
that any given set of animist phenomena may neces-
sitate may certainly involve engaging with Western 
ontological  revisions,  but  is  most  likely  to  require 
analytical  labour  that  goes  further  than  that,  and 
often in different directions. Viveiros de Castro’s novel 
conceptualization of ‘perspectivism’, precipitated by 
his analysis of Amerindian animism, is one example of 
this kind of work, and, within anthropology, Strathern 
and Wagner provide other inspiring examples. By way 
of closing, however, we may consider what archaeolo-
gy’s particular contribution to such a project might be. 
To do so, I return briefly to the Cambridge conference 
with which I began these reflections. 
The reaction of our fellow conference participants 
to my and my co-editors’ attempt to make the case 
for  the  ontologically-minded  approach  of  Thinking 
Through Things was mixed. A number of questioners 
challenged some of the more extreme implications of 
this way of thinking about difference. Perhaps the most 
penetrating observation came from the philosopher 
Andy Clark. As he pointed out, our core suggestion, 
namely that the contradictions that our descriptions 
of such phenomena as animism throw up are due to 
analytical misunderstanding rather than native error, 
seems to preclude any possibility that the people whose 
practices anthropologists and archaeologists describe 
might ever be wrong. What about flat earthers, for 
example, or proponents of Intelligent Design? While on 
some occasions it may be attractive to posit the kinds 
of ontological divergences for which we argued, one 
would also need a clear formulation of criteria that may 
distinguish them from cases of straight error. 
Our response to the question was, in gesture at 
least, typically anthropological: the relevant criteria 437
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for which Clark was rightly asking cannot be formu-
lated a priori, as a matter of methodological principle 
(as he may have perhaps preferred as a philosopher), 
but rather come down to the ethnographic details of 
each case. So, for example, the ontographic approach 
is compelling in the study of animist phenomena to 
the extent that the apparent contradictions that such 
cases throw up are thoroughgoing and, as it were, 
systematic. It is up to ethnographers to get their hands 
dirty by demonstrating that the kinds of ontological 
assumptions that judgments about ‘native error’ might 
involve (e.g. the distinction between ‘representation’ 
and ‘reality’) are indeed alien to the phenomena in 
question. Bray’s account of Andean animism, which I 
have used as my main example in this afterword, is a 
case in point, although all of the articles in the Special 
Section are likely to lend themselves to this argument. 
By contrast, what makes Intelligent Design compelling 
as a case of native error (and New Age Spirituality 
may be another good example) is the way in which 
it seeks to mix notions that may be comparable to 
animism in their apparent contradictions (e.g. notions 
of the Holy Spirit’s immanence in the Creation, or the 
spiritual agency of crystals), and then matches them 
with  putatively  ‘scientific’  justifications,  including 
the appeal to (variously misunderstood) ‘empirical 
evidence’, and so on. In such cases it may be ethno-
graphically demonstrable that having-the-cake-and-
eating-it contradictions are a feature of the phenomena 
themselves, rather than a function of our analytical 
misunderstandings of them. 
On the day, however, this appeal to ethnography 
as the litmus test of ontological alterity raised questions 
for  the  archaeologists  in  the  audience  in  particular 
— this was primarily an archaeological gathering after 
all. One questioner wondered whether our response to 
Clark would imply that anthropology, with its flagship 
investment in the ethnographic method, has a substan-
tial advantage over archaeology in this respect. Indeed, 
while the idea that the archaeological record can be 
interrogated for far more than just the probable ‘uses’ 
of particular finds is hardly news in the field these days, 
the questioner admitted to being at a loss as to how our 
ontologically-oriented approach could be adopted by 
working archaeologists. If the whole enterprise, as we 
argued, is premised on the idea that what may look 
like a single object may turn out to be two or more 
radically different things, corresponding to the different 
ontological assumptions one can bring to it, then how 
might archaeologists, who often have little more to go 
on than the objects themselves, gauge these ontological 
divergences? What counts as an ontographic clue and 
where might an archaeologist look for it?
My response at the time was as rude as Edmund 
Leach’s unfavourable comparisons between archaeo-
logy and anthropology were at a similar gathering 
thirty-five years earlier.6 At that time Leach had quite 
uncooperatively disparaged archaeologists for draw-
ing all sorts of speculative conclusions from the scanty 
information material remains provide. ‘[E]thnographic 
parallels’, he said, ‘suggest at least half a dozen alter-
native possibilities and none of them need be right’ 
(Leach 1973, 767). Archaeologists, he urged, should 
stick to asking mainly ‘“What” questions, such as: 
“What is the nature of my material?”, and admit that 
“How” and “Why” questions are often beyond their 
professional competence’ (Leach 1973, 764). My own 
reaction to the archaeologists in Cambridge was simi-
lar, only worse. The questioner’s premise, that things 
(including  archaeological  finds)  do  not  carry  their 
ontological status on their sleeve, is correct. Gauging 
the ontological status of any given thing must involve, 
first of all, finding out as much as one can about what 
people say about it and what they do with it, and this, 
as we all know, will have far-reaching ramifications 
that may relate to all aspects of the society in question 
(social, economic and political arrangements, kinship, 
cosmology, mythology, ritual and so on). To the extent 
that ethnographers are luckier than archaeologists in 
having direct access to this kind of data, it follows 
that they are better equipped to advance ontographic 
analyses,  including  varied  conceptualizations  of 
‘things’ in different ethnographic settings. One might 
even say that Leach was in this respect overly courte-
ous. When it comes to the kinds of things that are at 
issue in such phenomena as animism, archaeologists 
may be at a disadvantage even — or even particularly 
— at answering ‘What’ questions. 
Admittedly, some of the misgivings that under-
lay my rather knee-jerk response at the time, as well 
as Leach’s better-informed remarks, are in evidence 
in a number of the articles of this Special Section. In 
general, it is hard not to notice the abiding appeals 
to contemporary ethnography and ethnohistory of 
the contributions, and the weight this information is 
given in delineating the features of animist phenom-
ena belonging to the (often distant) past. For lack of 
professional  competence,  I  shall  not  dwell  on  this 
standard methodological issue, other than to note that 
while a number of the contributors (and particularly 
Zedeño, Groleau and Alberti & Marshall) do comment 
explicitly on the status of appeals to ethnographic 
‘analogies’ to elucidate archaeological materials, none 
of them seem to me to provide a concerted defence 
against the obvious charge of anachronism — one 
advanced rather devastatingly by Leach throughout 438
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the aforementioned piece. Indeed, from their propen-
sity to supplement archaeological findings with ethno-
graphic information, one could draw the conclusion 
that contributors to this issue share the view that the 
former are ‘poorer’ than the latter, and are therefore 
less likely to be able on their own to sustain robust 
hypotheses about the ontology of animist phenomena 
of the archaeological past. 
I  would  suggest,  however,  that  many  of  the 
arguments and, particularly, the modes of analysis 
presented in contributions to this Special Section also 
point towards a rather different stance. In fact, for 
me the most exciting effect of reading these contribu-
tions has been to help clarify why my response to the 
archaeologist’s question in Cambridge was in a crucial 
sense wrong.7 In particular, I want to suggest, the 
questioner and I (along with Leach and, some of the 
time, contributors to the present issue) were seduced 
by the undeniable richness of ethnographic materi-
als into losing sight of the peculiar capacities that 
archaeological engagements with ‘things’ (i.e. with 
archaeological finds) have for advancing the kinds of 
arguments regarding ontological diversity that I have 
discussed. In other words, reading the articles of this 
Special Section made me realize that there are impor-
tant senses in which ‘things’ do, after all, carry clues as 
to their own ontological status, and that archaeological 
methods and sensibilities are particularly well suited 
to show this and therefore have a distinctive contri-
bution to make to ontographic analyses, including 
analyses of animist phenomena. 
It pays to make the point by illustration. While 
there are many to be found in the pages of the preced-
ing articles, the most vivid one to my mind is Haber’s 
account of the ‘meat caches’, as he calls them, that he 
found at his field site in Archibarca. Haber’s intriguing 
analysis adopts the familiar archaeological trope of a 
detective story. In his original survey of Archibarca he 
was puzzled by haphazard-seeming piles of boulders 
scattered around the barren landscape. Initially he was 
doubtful whether they were even made by humans, 
but since they attracted attention to themselves he 
decided to call them ‘foci’, and on this basis developed 
a first ‘interpretation’, as he calls it (p. 421 this issue). 
Given evidence of vicuña hunting in the area, he sur-
mised that the foci served as deposits of stone appro-
priate for flaking cutting edges for the butchering of 
hunted  animals.  Having  killed  their  prey,  hunters 
could easily identify the closest pile of boulders, take 
their kill there, and obtain the tools necessary to proc-
ess the carcasses. A ‘functional’ account, then, allowed 
Haber to conceptualize an ‘intention’ and thus to treat 
the foci as archaeological sites (p. 421 this issue). 
Nevertheless, a number of data suggested that 
there was more to the story than this. For example, 
excavation at one of the foci sites revealed a series of 
animal products (hides, wool, cordage, and a dyed 
woollen  flower)  which  today  are  associated  with 
propitiatory rituals that are conducted by the inhabit-
ants of the area. Furthermore, when Haber showed 
photographs of the foci to residents of a nearby village, 
they identified them as ‘meat caches’, although they 
were unable to say whether meat was ever actually 
hidden there. Such data prompted Haber to elaborate 
his interpretation further, and this in two moves. 
First, by aligning his initial functional interpreta-
tion of the boulders with existing ethnographic data 
about local conceptions of human–animal relations 
(e.g.  the  reciprocity  between  human  hunters  and 
Pachamama, the ‘owner’ of the vicuña), he renders his 
account of the finds in Archibarca more complex. The 
meat caches, as he now preferred to call them, have to 
be understood as forming part of a more encompassing 
field of relationships, involving people, animals, gods 
and the landscape itself. Ethnographically informed, 
this way of thinking leads Haber to correlate the meat 
caches with other features of the landscape, including 
other important finds of the survey, such as man-made 
‘trenches’,  which  would  allow  hunters  to  surprise 
the vicuña, and ‘lines’ of boulders that, criss-crossing 
the landscape, would make it possible for hunters 
to influence the movement of their prey. In this way, 
Haber argues, the whole landscape of Archibarca can 
be understood as a ‘trap’ that sets up a ‘structure of 
anticipation’ that mediates the relationship between 
humans and animals in hunting (p. 425 this issue).
This notion of ‘anticipation’, however, precipitates 
Haber’s second move, which pushes his interpretation 
first beyond, and then against, considerations of func-
tion. For even thinking of the meat caches as part of 
a trap-like landscape does not account for the rather 
impractical exigencies of flaking. If hunters’ trap-like 
structures show that they ‘anticipated’ the killing of 
their prey, then why did they leave the flaking of tools 
till after the killing had taken place? Surely it would 
have been more functional for hunters to prepare their 
tools in advance of the hunt and use them on the spot of 
the killing, rather than having to carry the carcass over 
to a fixed deposit of ‘raw’ stones. Indeed, from a func-
tional point of view, the temporal mismatch between 
the meat caches, which may have stood at the same spot 
for millennia, waiting to be ‘used’, and the immediate 
requirements of a hunt is just as puzzling. So here is 
Haber’s clincher, which is worth citing in full:
While  the  relation  between  raw  material  caching 
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the quite probable incongruence between the time 
scales  of  the  cache  and  that  of  the  human  body 
implies something other than mere functionality. […] 
Indeed, if one considers the time-scale incongruence 
together  with  the  time  reversal  of  the  functional 
chain, where the cutting edge comes first and the 
need for it will eventually come later, the whole 
structure of anticipation departs from a functionally 
driven practice and approaches a propitiation ritual. 
Given that the stone is placed in anticipation of the 
hunt, but not necessarily of this hunt in particular 
but of the hunt-in-general, it is the cutting edge that 
seems to be soliciting the prey to come and yield to 
the butchering of its carcass. It is not the meat that 
calls for the cutting edge, but the other way round. 
(pp. 425–6, this issue)
And  there  we  have  it:  ontological  difference.  What 
looked like impractical tools are shown to be stones 
that can ‘call’ prey — an ‘animist’ phenomenon that not 
only seems to transgress putative ontological bounda-
ries, but also, in classic ‘magical’ style, contradicts our 
assumptions about causal and temporal orders. 
Now,  clearly  Haber’s  account  does  involve 
substantial appeals to contemporary ethnography, so 
a cursory reading may suggest that his article bears 
out the notion that archaeological materials alone can-
not support arguments about ontological difference. 
However, as I have tried to highlight in my summary, 
this would be a misreading. While ethnography helps 
Haber to ‘disrupt’ his initial and rather rudimentarily 
functional interpretation (see Alberti & Marshall, p. 
345 this issue), it is neither necessary to, nor in any 
clear way operative in, the non-functional argument 
he ends up making. It is not Haber’s account of Pach-
amama and so on that motivates the final interpretative 
shift — after all, at that stage of his argument he is 
still thinking along functional lines, in terms of the 
‘anticipations’ of ‘traps’. Rather, it is his reasoning 
about the exigencies of stone, flaking, hunting and so 
on, and their disruption by the meat caches’ particular 
characteristics, including their position in time and 
space, that clinches the point. Ethnography may pro-
vide clues, one might say, but archaeological methods 
deliver the conclusions. 
In light of such strategies, I am now tempted 
to put my error in the Cambridge conference down 
to a basic category mistake. To see this, we may note 
first that my insistence that gauging the ontological 
status  of  ‘things’  (and  by  extension  archaeological 
finds) must involve tracing their role in sundry social 
and cultural settings was basically a statement of the 
credo of ‘holism’ — a credo so fervent among anthro-
pologists that we often barely notice it is there (see 
also Holbraad 2007). Now, there may be little doubt 
that, in one or other of its many versions, holism is 
methodologically indispensable to what I have been 
calling ‘mainstream’ approaches in anthropology. As 
we have seen, the objective of such approaches is to 
describe and account for socio-cultural phenomena 
such  as  animism. And  since  such  phenomena  are 
indeed ‘socio-cultural’, it makes sense that describing 
and explaining (or interpreting) them will involve 
placing them within the ‘broader’ context of social or 
cultural ‘wholes’.
In  my  comments  in  Cambridge  I  assumed 
that this requirement for holism must carry over to 
ontographic approaches also. Arguably, however, it 
doesn’t. As we have seen, ontography does not, as 
such, involve describing or explaining socio-cultural 
phenomena. It involves identifying phenomena that 
defy description, in order to use them as a vantage 
point from which to engage in thought-experimental 
conceptualizations that may allow us to understand 
them. Certainly, socio-cultural phenomena do provide 
ample opportunities for this kind of analysis, and 
holistic treatments may be interesting in this respect 
for their own reasons. (For example, as an ethnogra-
pher of Afro-Cuban divination, I am interested in find-
ing out how the totality of this practice, which relates 
to well nigh all aspects of people’s lives, challenges a 
whole series of Western ‘common sense’ assumptions.) 
However, there is no principled reason to assume that 
‘total’, holistically (mis)described phenomena are the 
only, or even the best, kinds of data for ontographic 
analysis. By substituting the aims of description and 
explanation of socio-cultural totalities with that of 
advancing novel conceptualizations, as ontography 
does, a host of non-holistic data may offer themselves 
up for analysis. The criteria for candidacy, after all, 
centre not on how ‘completely’ one can (mis)describe 
them, but rather on how robustly one can show that 
they challenge our initial assumptions. 
Haber’s mode of analysis, then, illustrates this. 
I suspect he may agree that, taken as an account of 
animism and hunting in prehistoric Archibarca, his 
contribution  would  seem  overly  speculative  and 
nowhere near as rich as comparable ethnographies. 
After all, as is common in archaeological research of 
this nature, the core of his data relates to the few rem-
nants we have of those times, scattered in and within 
an arid landscape. What his account shows, rather, is 
that, suitably treated, this small proportion (at most) 
of what ethnographers would have recorded had they 
been able to visit the site at times when it was still in 
use can set up challenges to one’s assumptions about 
‘materiality’, ‘efficacy’, ‘causation’, and so on, that are 
arguably as ontographically compelling as anything 440
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an ethnographer might come up with. So the fact that 
archaeological research works at a different ‘scale’, if 
you like, than ethnography — the scale of archaeo-
logical finds — does not put it at a disadvantage from 
an ontographic point of view. As Marilyn Strathern 
argues in a different context, the change of scale does 
not imply a reduction in complexity (Strathern 2004; 
see also Holbraad & Pedersen in press). 
So, if I may be permitted a final attempt to score 
points off the mainstream, it would appear that an 
ontologically-oriented approach is able to free archaeol-
ogy from the charge of ‘data poverty’ and the variously 
anachronistic appeals to contemporary ethnography 
that stem from it. Of course, many working archaeolo-
gists (and possibly all of their lay admirers, and not least 
the wider, Time-Team-watching public) would not be 
prepared to pay the price of this, which is to give up 
the notion that archaeology is in the business of giving 
us as full a picture of our past as possible — describing 
it, interpreting it, and so on. It goes without saying that 
I am not suggesting that archaeologists should give up 
this wonderful modernist dream — only that they could 
recognize it for what it is, be ware of its ontological pit-
falls, and be aware that there is an alternative. Indeed, 
if I were to hazard a guess (for lack of expertise I can 
do no more), I would suggest that the most pressing 
line of research in pursuing such an alternative would 
come closest to what Zedeño and Groleau in particular 
set forth in their contributions to the present volume, 
namely attempts to overhaul archaeological methods in 
ways that render them sensitive to alternative ontolo-
gies of things. 
Martin Holbraad
Department of Anthropology
University College London
Gower Street
London
WC1E 6BT
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Notes
1.  Particularly so if the term ‘things’ designates not only 
the  objects  archaeologists  and  anthropologists  call 
‘material culture’, but also the apparently non-‘material’ 
things the people they study may identify with them in 
all sorts of ways — thoughts, memories, emotions, rela-
tionships, capacities, forces, animals, spirits, persons, 
gods.
2.  Held  in  April  2006  at  the  McDonald  Institute,  the 
symposium was titled ‘The Cognitive Life of Things: 
Recasting the Boundaries of the Mind’ (see Malafouris 
& Renfrew in press).
3.  The roots of the alternatives these authors present can 
be traced to authors as diverse as Lucien Lévy-Bruhl, 
Marcel  Mauss,  E.E.  Evans-Pritchard,  Maurice  Lien-
hardt, Claude Lévi-Strauss, David Schneider, Gregory 
Bateson, Louis Dumont, Rodney Needham and Edwin 
Ardner, albeit in often germinal form and on variously 
charitable interpretations.
4.  For less speculative examples and discussions of what 
Roy Wagner called ‘reverse anthropology’ (1981, 31) see 
Kirsch (2006) and Viveiros de Castro (2007).
5.  For an example of the divergent analyses that differ-
ent animist phenomena can precipitate, with specific 
reference to comparisons between ‘perspectivism’ in 
Amazonia and Inner Asia, see Holbraad & Willerslev 
(2007).
6.  I  am  referring  to  Leach’s  ‘Concluding  address’  to 
the conference ‘The Explanation of Culture Change: 
Models in Prehistory’, held in 1971 in Sheffield, whose 
eponymous proceedings were edited by Renfrew (1973). 
I thank Chris Wingfield for drawing my attention to 
this text and, more generally, for orienting me in the 
literature on the role of ethnography in archaeology.
7.  I am also grateful to Morten Nielsen, an anthropologist, 
for helping me clarify these thoughts in conversation 
— although I suspect he would be inclined to take them 
further.
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